Tag: climate risk

  • Thread by thread by threadโ€ฆ uncovering the fashion industry’s hidden exposures to climate risk

    Thread by thread by threadโ€ฆ uncovering the fashion industry’s hidden exposures to climate risk

    I suspect you already know how climate risk affects our food systems. We can all imagine how a wheat harvest in one region travels through a global supply chain, through milling, processing and logistics until it becomes a crisis in a country that is entirely reliant on imports for that most fundamental of grains. When a major harvest fails, global prices spike. When prices spike, people notice.

    Fashion faces a structurally similar set of risks, but almost none of the same urgency. The geography of production is concentrated in some of the most climate-exposed regions on earth. The value chain is long, opaque and deeply interdependent, and the businesses at its centre sit at the furthest possible remove from the physical realities embedded in it.

    The critical difference from food is not one of scale but of consequence. When grain harvests fail, food prices spike, governments fall and the IMF convenes. Nobody goes hungry when a coat fails to arrive, or when a fashion brand posts disappointing quarterly results. The moral distance between a disrupted dyeing cluster and a poor financial result is (understandably) so long that the underlying physical cause is rarely named and even more rarely addressed.

    “Nobody goes hungry when a coat fails to arrive”

    But anyone with a cultural or financial interest in the world of fashion should recognise that the fashion industry faces a structurally similar set of risks to our food systems. Nor do these risks discriminate, affecting everyone from the fastest of fast-fashion brands to the highest of luxury houses.

    In this article, weโ€™ll explore why the fashion industry is more exposed to physical climate risk than it first appears, how climate risks cascade through the fashion value chain and how fashion brands can take the first step towards building resilience.


    A quick note on scope: the fashion industry faces substantial climate-related transition risks,  from regulation, shifting consumer expectations, green claims legislation and mandatory supply chain due diligence. That risk is real and growing, but it is a subject for another article. The focus here is on physical climate risk: what rising temperatures, changing precipitation pattern, and more frequent extreme weather events do to the physical systems on which the fashion industry depends.


    Why fashionโ€™s business model makes it particularly susceptible to physical climate risks

    While each layer of the fashion supply chain faces specific risks from climate change (more on those later), itโ€™s worth dwelling on some of the structural features that shape the industry’s inherent vulnerability.

    Geographic concentration. Letโ€™s start with an obvious one: the fashion supply chain is very poorly distributed. Cotton production is clustered in a handful of regions, particularly Pakistan’s Indus basin, Uzbekistan’s river-fed plain and the American South. These just so happen to overlap with some of the highest climate risk zones on the planet. Textile dyeing and finishing are even more concentrated, dominated by a small number of river-basin clusters in South and East Asia. Garment assembly follows a similar pattern, with Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Cambodia together accounting for a disproportionate share of global apparel exports. Concentration of this kind is efficient in stable conditions, but the reliance on regions that are highly susceptible to climatic instability turns an isolated risk into a systemic vulnerability.

    Long forward planning cycles. Fashion typically operates on a 12 to 18 month horizon. Brands commit to volume and specification far in advance of the selling season, purchasing fabric, placing manufacturing orders and booking logistics capacity on the assumption that conditions at the point of production will be roughly similar to conditions at the point of order. That assumption has always held more or less true, but is already becoming less reliable. As climatic conditions become less stable, a system designed for predictability will increasingly be tested in conditions of growing volatility.

    Supply chain opacity. Like many industries, fashion brands have reasonable visibility of their Tier 1 suppliers. In most cases, these are the factories that cut and sew the garments they sell. Very few have meaningful visibility of the rest of the supply chain: the mills that produce the fabric, the facilities that dye and finish it or the farms that grow the fibre. The practical consequence of this opacity is that brands are rarely able to locate their own climate exposure. The inability to accurately identify points of risk or understand how they might impact production represents a systemic challenge.


    The great cascade: how climate risk affects the entire fashion value chain

    The fashion industryโ€™s systemic risks exacerbate the significant physical risks at each level of the supply and value chain, from the production of raw fibre through to the final customer.

    Raw fibre

    Almost every fibre, natural and synthetic, face vulnerabilities to climate risk. There are detailed studies of the impact of climate change on almost every fibre used in clothing, but here are just a couple of the most important examples:

    Cotton is extraordinarily sensitive to heat and water availability. The 2022 Pakistan floods, driven by a combination of glacial melt and an intensified monsoon, destroyed more than a third of the country’s cotton crop in a single season. Pakistan produces around five per cent of global cotton output and its loss sent ripple effects through spinning mills across South Asia. Meanwhile the US South, another major producing region, faces increasing heat stress during the critical boll development phase and the southern High Plains portion of the Ogallala aquifer, which irrigates much of the American cotton belt, will approach depletion in decades at its current rate of decline. Regions which for so long have been relied upon to grow a steady, cheap supply of cotton are increasingly threatened.

    Perhaps less obvious is the risk to synthetic fibres. Polyester and nylon, which collectively account for more than two thirds of all fibre production globally, are derived from petrochemical feedstocks. Petrochemical infrastructure is concentrated along coastlines and river deltas, making it vulnerable to flooding and storm surge. Refineries and cracker facilities are also energy-intensive and sensitive to grid instability, particularly in the countries where they have traditionally been concentrated. The assumption that synthetic fibres provide a reliable climate-independent alternative to natural fibres does not stand up to a proper understanding of climate risk, even before the transition impacts on petrochemical derivatives is considered.

    Yarn and fabric production

    Spinning and weaving tend to follow the geography of fibre production, with facilities situated close to the fields and factories producing raw natural and synthetic fibres. This means that they share many of the same physical risks, compounding the impacts of increasingly likely climate events. What is less commonly considered is that these are among the most highly energy-intensive processes in the fashion supply chain, dependent on stable and affordable electricity. As climate events stress power grids, through peak demand during heatwaves, damage to transmission infrastructure and the cascading effects of flooding on power stations, manufacturing facilities face operational disruption even when they are physically undamaged. A factory may be well protected, but without power it produces nothing.

    Dyeing and finishing

    In all our conversations with fashion procurement teams, this remains the most underappreciated step in the fashion supply chain from a climate risk perspective. Textile dyeing is extraordinarily water-intensive. A single kilogram of dyed fabric can require anything between 30 and 500 litres of water to process depending on the fabric type, process and dye. The worldโ€™s dyeing and finishing clusters, from the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong to the Narayanganj corridor in Bangladesh, are built around river systems that are under increasing stress from changing precipitation patterns, glacial retreat and competition for water between industrial, agricultural and domestic users.

    In some ways, this risk is even more profound than what happens in the fields and factories upstream. Cotton fields can, in theory at least, be relocated. River-dependent dyeing clusters cannot. The infrastructure is fixed, the water dependency is total and the alternatives are limited. A multi-month drought or contamination event affecting one of these clusters has the potential to hold up production across every brand that depends on it, regardless of where the fabric is produced or the garments are assembled.

    Garment assembly

    Within fashion procurement, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Cambodia have become the most widely recognised and well-discussed places at severe risk from climate change. Coastal flooding, cyclone intensity and rising sea levels threaten infrastructure, while wet-bulb temperatures approaching the limits of safe working threaten worker productivity and health. The International Labour Organization has estimated that productivity losses from heat stress in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of South and South-East Asia could be equivalent to tens of millions of full-time jobs by 2030.

    What receives less attention is the adaptation gap. The regions that carry the most physical risk also tend to be those with the least institutional and financial capacity to adapt.

    Logistics

    Shipping routes are not passive infrastructure. They are geographically determined, physically constrained and increasingly exposed to a range of challenging climate dynamics. The Straits of Malacca, through which the majority of fashion’s Asian production must pass, sit at the intersection of typhoon risk, sea level rise and the compounding climate vulnerability of the port cities at either end. The increasing risk of drought on the Panama Canal (whose vulnerability was demonstrated in 2023 when significant draft restrictions were applied) constrains the rerouting options that brands might otherwise rely upon in a crisis.

    Retail and demand

    The final node is the least discussed in physical climate terms, but carries real financial significance. Fashion’s volume-forward buying model, committing to large quantities of seasonal stock months before the selling season, rests on the assumption that seasons are broadly predictable. That assumption is eroding fast.

    Warm winters damage sell-through on outerwear; cold springs delay the transition to summer ranges; unseasonable heat spikes demand for stock that has already been marked down. While none of this is catastrophic in isolation, the repeated disruption to carefully calibrated pricing models creates pressure when margins are already tight.

    The financial model of many fashion brands can absorb a seasonal shock or two, but it has not been designed to cope with consistent inconsistency.


    When the Pearl Water Delta dries up: a real-world scenario

    Abstract supply chain analysis is all well and good, but it only gets you so far. Letโ€™s imagine for a second what a real cascade actually looks like, from a physical event to real financial impact.

    It is spring 2027. A prolonged drought across Guangdong province has, over three months, cut water availability in the Pearl River Delta to well below seasonal norms. The dyeing and finishing clusters that process a significant share of Asia’s export fabric begin rationing water allocations between facilities. Higher-margin orders are prioritised and mid-market volume orders, the kind that fill the shelves of European and American retailers, are pushed back. Some facilities reduce operating hours. A handful shut temporarily.

    Brands with fabric orders in the pipeline receive delay notices. Procurement teams escalate. Some attempt to redirect orders to alternative dyeing facilities in Bangladesh and India, which are already running at capacity. Lead times that were tight become impossible. Garment factories in Dhaka and Ho Chi Minh City and now waiting on fabric that has not arrived and begin falling behind on cut-and-sew schedules. They were already managing rising summer temperatures that are pushing effective working hours earlier in the day.

    The brand’s options are now all expensive. They could air-freight the fabric when it finally clears and absorb the margin hit on those SKUs. Alternatively, they could accept the late deliveries into a shortened selling window and markdown earlier. If things get really rough, they may even cancel orders, take the inventory write-down and enter the autumn season with gaps in the range.

    By the time this appears in a quarterly results presentation, it will be described as supply chain disruption, elevated freight costs or challenging trading conditions. It will not be described as a drought. The causal chain from reservoir levels in Guangdong to a margin miss reported in London or New York is real and traceable, but almost never traced.

    This is how physical climate risk tends to arrive in fashion. They are almost never described as catastrophes, but as a cluster of ordinary-looking commercial problems, spread across a chain that most brands cannot fully see. In food systems, the signal from a harvest failure is fast, loud, and visible. In fashion, the equivalent signal is slow, diffuse, and arrives dressed as underperformance. By the time it is visible, the decisions that could have mitigated it are long past.

    “The causal chain from reservoir levels in Guangdong to a margin miss reported in London or New York is real and traceable, but almost never traced.”


    So what can you to do manage the risk?

    Until very recently, very few fashion brands designed their information architecture to understand physical climate risks.

    Brands know their Tier 1 factories. They do not systematically know where their fabric comes from, which river their dye house depends on, which aquifer feeds their cotton supplier’s irrigation system or which coastal road their logistics provider uses when the highway floods. This means that they routinely make sourcing decisions and create financial forecasts on the assumption of stability in a supply chain that is largely opaque at best.

    The question for fashion businesses is whether they understand their physical climate risk exposure to be able to make strategic decisions with confidence.

    The good news is that the first step to addressing these very real risks is much more achievable than it might appear.

    Brands do not need to solve supply chain opacity overnight to begin managing physical climate risk meaningfully. Mapping Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers for the highest-volume product lines can reveal where the most material exposures sit. Understanding the specific risks affecting each of those suppliers and how these could affect production can help identify the nodes where disruption is most likely and most consequential

    From there, the options are familiar to every fashion buyer: supplier diversification away from single climate-stressed geographies, contingency sourcing arrangements, adjusted inventory buffers for climate-exposed categories and scenario planning that treats climate disruption as a foreseeable operational risk.

    The brands that take these first steps will not be immune to physical climate risks, but they will be significantly better prepared than their competitors when climate events disrupt vulnerable supply chains.


    Understanding your true exposure to climate risk is complex but achievable. If youโ€™d like to explore how to identify, quantify and manage climate risks across your value chain, Sirocco can help.

  • Our climate is reshaping the economics of our food systems. How can you prepare for what happens next?

    Our climate is reshaping the economics of our food systems. How can you prepare for what happens next?

    Climate change is already putting global food systems under stress, with isolated commodity crises wreaking havoc on some of the world’s largest manufacturers of coffee, chocolate and olive oil.

    The climate risks facing food and beverage supply chains are broad, deep and interconnected, but there is still a case for optimism. But while these risks are material, they are not unknowable and they are not unmanageable. As the climate crisis deepens, the future will belong to those who understand their exposure risks and build resilience into their future strategies.


    An uncertain future

    In his book Ravenous, Henry Dimbleby (the co-founder of Leon and author of the UK’s National Food Strategy) presents compelling evidence that the biggest threats to our food supply are climate change and ecosystem collapse. The past two years have offered food manufacturers and consumers a glimpse of that unpredictability.

    In 2024, cocoa prices surged by 300% in less than a year, coffee hit near-50-year highs, sugar prices shot up and olive oil yields collapsed. For consumers, the most visible consequences were increased prices in the shops and rapid โ€˜shrinkflationโ€™ of our favourite sweet treats. But for an industry already feeling the effects of rising input costs, these headlines were just the warning shots of an ever-growing threat.

    For any food or beverage business, their response to these risks will be individual and nuanced, but understanding these risks is a huge first step towards adapting to an uncertain climatic future. By mapping exposures, understanding vulnerabilities and building strategies that can flex to the growing pressures of a changing climate, resilience is possible.

    In this article, weโ€™ll take a look at how these risks might shape the sector in the coming years, exploring how businesses should respond to the threats to gain a strategic advantage over their competitors.

    Note: this article doesnโ€™t dig into the mechanisms by which individual commodities are threatened (water, temperature, pollinators, etc.). These are specific to each commodity and region and require far deeper and more nuanced analysis than can be given here. Instead weโ€™ll focus on how food manufacturers should think about the threats to both individual commodities and the wider food system as a starting point to building resilien


    Growing threats to key commodities

    TL;DR: as the forces of climate change intensify, raw materials will continue to become more expensive and less predictable, impacting not just individual commodities but the global food system as a whole. The effects of demand substitution mean that the impact is not limited to those in at-risk sectors, but almost all food manufacturers and suppliers.

    The commodity crisis of 2024-5 brought the climate-related risks facing our food systems into mainstream conversation. The headlines told a story of systemic supply failure that rewrote the economics of everything from chocolate bars to instant coffee.

    In the simplest terms, the cause was a year of El Niรฑo-induced droughts, record wildfires in Brazil and crop disease spreading through West African cocoa farms. The highly interconnected nature of our food systems meant that these seemingly isolated issues cascaded into a nightmare scenario for some of the worldโ€™s biggest manufacturers: Hershey’s gross margins fell from 47% to 33%, Mondelez saw its earnings-per-share estimates slashed by double digits Nestlรฉ’s leading brands had to quietly drop the word “chocolate” from some product labels as falling cocoa content breached legal thresholds.

    In a single year of disruption, the fragility of the supply chains of these corporate behemoths was laid bare.

    And yet there was one big source of optimism: while the giants of the chocolate world suffered, the Dutch chocolate brand Tonyโ€™s Chocolonely proved a beacon of resilience. Since 2019, Tonyโ€™s have pioneered traceability and prioritised farmer relationships through their Open Chain sourcing programme. When the supply chain shock arrived, they were significantly less impacted than their larger competitors, suffering crop losses at half the industry average. As competitors struggled, Tony’s revenue and volume both grew, with gross margin barely impacted. CEO (or Chief Chocolonely) Douglas Lamont explicitly credits their sourcing model for the companyโ€™s resilience. Tonyโ€™s resilience in the face of climate shocks should serve as an inspiration as we look ahead to an even more uncertain climatic future. As in all things, preparation is key.

    “We’ve shown how resilient and effective our model is with strong growth in revenue, volume, profitability and, most importantly, impact on the ground for cocoa-farming families.”

    Douglas Lamont, Chief Chocolonely at Tonyโ€™s Chocolonely

    While the success of Tony’s should be cause for optimism, the climatic threats to our food system, both chronic and acute, are growing. By way of a single example, corn (one of the worldโ€™s most important food crops) loses yield sharply when temperatures breach 35ยฐC during its short pollination window. In the worldโ€™s great cornbaskets, such as the US Midwest, this threshold is now being crossed with increasing and alarming frequency.

    The hidden risks of demand substitution

    It would be easy to imagine that this threat is limited to those manufacturers reliant on the crops and commodities most at risk from climate change. However, such a view ignores the structure of our food economy. In reality, there is a less visible threat that should be a major concern to a much wider range of food producers: demand substitution. In simple terms, those ingredients that will remain physically available in a hotter, drier world may become significantly more expensive as other industries compete for them when other commodities begin to fail.

    Take, for example, the world’s reliance on cereal crops to feed the ever-growing global population. Most growth models show that barley yields are fairly resilient to climate change because it can be grown at a wide range of latitudes. That might sound like good news for the breweries and distilleries that rely on barley as one of their primary ingredients. However, under these same scenarios, yields of other cereal crops, such as wheat and corn, could decrease significantly. Under such a scenario, it is logical to assume that demand for barley as a substitute source of calories, livestock feed or biofuel would increase, raising prices of the brewerโ€™s primary ingredient, despite its resilience to climate change.

    We are facing a future in which raw materials become both more expensive and less predictable, in a way that impacts not just individual commodities but the global food system as a whole. The challenge this presents is that hedging and procurement strategies built around historical price relationships become increasingly unreliable, precisely when they are most needed.

    The takeaway: manufacturers who haven’t mapped either their direct ingredient exposure or the second-order demand pressures have a strategic blind spot.  Those who understand these pressures will be in a significantly stronger position to make informed decisions towards building resilient ingredient supply chains.


    Supply chain logistics are just as important as what happens in the field

    TL;DR: most climate risk assessments in the food industry include a companyโ€™s own assets and a few choice suppliers. However, complex supply chains are vulnerable to disruption in much more complex and nuanced ways. A flood at a major port, energy grid failure in a processing region or a wildfire ripping through a warehouse could all impact production severely. These risks can be hard to see, but careful analysis can reveal hidden opportunities to build resilience.

    Every food manufacturer sits at the end of a long and complex global value chain. Between a consumer and the ingredients in their food lies a network of farms, processing facilities, transport routes, ports, logistics hubs and packaging suppliers. Each node in this supply chain carries its own distinct vulnerabilities to a climate system that is becoming more volatile by the year.

    The mistake most climate risk assessments make is to focus only on the very start and the very end of this complex chain.

    A flood at a Southeast Asian port, for example, could be enough to stop a production line, without having any direct impact on a companyโ€™s own facilities or on the farm producing the raw material. In recent years, unusually dry seasons have caused low water levels on the Mississippi and the Rhine, disrupting commodity barge traffic and threatening production. The impact of excluding these โ€˜supportingโ€™ nodes of the value chain from an assessment can be profound: research published in the International Journal of Disaster Risk Science found that just including power outages in a risk assessment showed an increase in economic losses by 300%.

    The right question for a manufacturer to ask is not “which of our factories and suppliers are exposed to climate hazards?”. The question needs to evolve to “which processes underpin our revenue, and how do the climate vulnerabilities across the value chain impact these processes?”

    This analysis, while complex, is entirely achievable. The most useful outputs are derived by mapping and focusing on the most revenue-critical nodes within the wider value chain. By analysing how each node is exposed to climate-related risks and modelling how disruption to these nodes might cascade to impact revenue, businesses can identify where mitigation is needed most.

    The takeaway: an organisation undertaking a deeper level of assessment has the potential to make far better capital allocation decisions, build more resilient supplier relationships and be faster to respond when disruption arrives.


    Regulation is accelerating and the investor-expectation gap is widening

    TL;DR: Around the world, climate risk reporting and supply chain transparency regulations are evolving and growing rapidly. For those who are unprepared, the most obvious risk of non-compliance is limitations on market access. However, investors are increasingly becoming more literate in the topic of climate risk and are beginning to demand greater due diligence around climate risk. As a result, failure to stay ahead of complex regulation could threaten access to capital and increase exposure to litigation risk.

    The global regulatory landscape for climate risk and supply chain transparency is evolving rapidly. Here in the UK, Sustainability Reporting Standards were formally published in February, with mandatory disclosure rules for listed companies expected from 2027. In Australia, Brazil and beyond, equivalent ISSB-aligned frameworks are either in force or in advanced development. In the EU, despite the Omnibus narrowing the scope of CSRD, the direction of travel remains firmly toward greater transparency.

    Meanwhile, the UKโ€™s Forest-Risk Commodity regulations are in development, with similar aims to the EUโ€™s even more stringent deforestation regulation. While the specifics of the two regulations differ materially, both place material due diligence obligations for food manufacturers who source ingredients with high deforestation risk. Arguably, the fact the two regulations differ significantly may increase the burden on any manufacturers or importers operating across both the UK and EU.

    The message is clear: climate risk reporting is quickly becoming a global commercial reality.

    For food manufacturers, the most immediate consequence of falling behind these standards is market access. Driven primarily by compliance obligations, retailers across Europe are already demanding supply chain sustainability data from their suppliers as a condition of trading. Looking ahead, manufacturers who cannot demonstrate traceability, evidence their climate-related risks or show credible plans for addressing them may increasingly find themselves at a commercial disadvantage.

    A less obvious but equally substantial risk lies in the availability of capital. As the maturity of disclosure grows, so investors are beginning to become sophisticated in their understanding of climate risk. In the immediate term, a disclosure that is technically compliant may still be sufficient, but that will change rapidly. As investors begin to consider the financial implications of climate risk, so a mature approach to mitigation will become an increasingly important factor in major investment decisions.

    The takeaway: the manufacturers who will benefit from this emerging regulatory environment are those who work to understand how climate change will shape the future of their business and build genuine analytical capability. The quality of an organisationโ€™s climate analysis will become an increasingly defining factor in the strength of relationships with both capital and customers. Those who get ahead of it will find that regulation and disclosure, paradoxically, can become a competitive advantage.


    So what can food manufacturers do now?

    The climate risks facing food and beverage manufacturers can feel complex, opaque and uncertain. However, they are not beyond the reach of any organisation that engages with them seriously. A deeper understanding of these risks and the development of an effective mitigation plan could be key to growing market share in an environment where supply chains are regularly threatened and investors increasingly prioritise climate risk.

    Here are the 4 questions you should start asking right now:

    1. Which of our ingredients face direct threat from chronic climatic change or acute hazards?
    2. Which of our ingredients face substitution-driven demand pressure as other crops struggle?
    3. Where else does risk enter our operations, supply chain and distribution networks?
    4. Are our regulatory disclosures credible enough to withstand serious investor scrutiny?

    The takeaway: none of these questions are easy, but all of them are answerable. Those who choose to investigate thoroughly, rather than scrambling to catch up, have the opportunity to seize the strategic advantage and build resilience for an uncertain future.


    The climate-related risks facing the food sector are extensive, but they can be managed.

    If you need support to understand and manage your organisation’s exposure to these risks, and how to turn them into a strategic advantage, we’re here to help.

  • Beyond the models: the 5 climate tail risks that organisations should be worrying about right now

    Beyond the models: the 5 climate tail risks that organisations should be worrying about right now

    Regardless of the politics of the USโ€™s latest excursion in the Middle East, continued disruption to the Straits of Hormuz threatens to have deep and lasting impacts on the global economy. The crisis has revealed in primary colours the vulnerabilities of our highly connected global economy.

    To business leaders and boardrooms, it should serve as a prescient warning of our current inability to adapt to the environmental, commercial and socio-economic tail risks we might face in the near future. And yet, for now at least, the vast majority of climate risk assessments ignore these tail risks as if they didn’t even exist.

    (For a quick but solid primer on the economic impacts of the US-Iran War, give Bryce Engelland’s piece for Thomson Reuters a read).


    Why climate risk assessments ignore tail risks

    Climate risk assessments rarely focus on deterministic scenarios, major tipping points or catastrophic tail risks.

    The reason is frustratingly simple: climate tail risks are notoriously difficult to predict and their potential impact can be almost impossible to quantify. Put bluntly, they don’t fit neatly into a quantitative risk report. In fact, such catastrophic scenarios are often written off as black swans, the hidden risks that Donald Rumsfeld once referred to as โ€œunknown unknownsโ€. But a lack of imagination is a very poor reason to ignore events that, while far from certain, could have potentially catastrophic consequences on individual businesses, entire industries or even the global economy.

    For now, most climate risk analysis remains trapped in what Mark Cliffe calls โ€œmodel landโ€. Many of our current models, including NGFS, imagine a world of tidy linear transitions and manageable temperature pathways that bear limited resemblance to what is actually happening to our planet. Iain Watt puts it even more starkly: โ€œthe failure to even consider tipping points, amongst a wider lack of appreciation of the uncertainties within climate projections, surely represents a failure at the first hurdle?โ€

    A more realistic understanding of climate risk requires us to consider a series of tail risks and potential tipping points. Though complex, this is not impossible; it just requires a little imagination. Through considered simulation and planning, organisations can turn hidden risks into understandable scenarios, forming the basis for more complete risk analysis and mitigation.


    Below I have outlined 5 climate shocks that organisations should consider stress-testing their strategies and business models against:

    1. Disruption to the Strait of Malacca
    2. Insurance market collapse
    3. Sovereign climate default
    4. Failure of the US Corn Belt
    5. Permafrost methane feedback loop

    Please note: this list includes just 1 climate tipping point and several climate-related tail risks. I have barely scratched the surface in my analysis of each but I will be publishing further, more detailed articles on some of these in future: There are many others I could have included, but I hope the spread of economic, political and social scenarios will serve as a healthy starting point to begin looking beyond the steady, linear climate models that inform most climate risk assessments. West African cocoa farms. The highly interconnected nature of our food systems meant that these seemingly isolated issues cascaded into a nightmare scenario for some of the worldโ€™s biggest manufacturers: Hershey’s gross margins fell from 47% to 33%, Mondelez saw its earnings-per-share estimates slashed by double digits Nestlรฉ’s leading brands had to quietly drop the word “chocolate” from some product labels as falling cocoa content breached legal thresholds.


    Disruption to the Strait of Malacca

    TL;DR: the Strait of Malacca carry even more oil than Hormuz, and are under significant threat from cyclones and burning of damaged peatlands. Major disruption to the Strait could cause a major fuel price spike, while also affecting supply chains to and from Northeast Asia.

    Why does it matter ?

    Roughly one third of global seaborne trade passes through the Strait of Malacca. This includes around 25-30% of global oil consumption, making it the single largest oil chokepoint in the world. Itโ€™s also critical for LNG flows, as well as commodities and consumer goods flowing to and from Northeast Asia.

    Asiaโ€™s largest economies are particularly dependent on these Strait but the impact of major disruption on oil prices would have a global impact comparable to what we are witnessing as a result of the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

    While the impacts would be globally significant, companies with supply chains in Asia should be particularly wary of their exposure to a prolonged shutdown.

    What’s the threat from climate change?

    The waters feeding into the Strait โ€“ namely the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea โ€“ are warming faster than global ocean averages.  This is already intensifying cyclone and typhoon formation, a trend which will only intensify as the seas continue to warm. Such extreme weather could cause major damage to port infrastructure or force shipping to halt for a prolonged period.

    Sumatra and Borneoโ€™s vast peatlands, already degraded by land-use change and drying, produce catastrophic smoke hazes. In 2015 and 2019, visibility in the Strait fell to near-zero for extended periods, disrupting the flow of goods. Such incidents are likely to become more frequent as dry periods are extended, and the peatlands continue to be depleted.

    Itโ€™s also worth bearing in mind that  the closest suitable alternative route is through the Lombok Strait, adding 1,000 nautical miles to the journey, increasing fuel costs and time.


    Insurance market collapse

    TL;DR: the insurance industry is vital to the functioning of the global economy and is already under significant strain as a result of climate change. Even a partial failure could have ramifications for almost every industry in the world.

    Why does it matter?

    Insurance is the load-bearing wall of the global economy and the bedrock of capitalism. By diversifying and managing risk, it enables the most fundamental facets of our economy. It also controls one of the most significant pools of institutional capital, with systemically important investments across virtually every market on earth. It should therefore be a source of the most pressing alarm that this vital industry could be brought to its knees by climate change.

    I could (and will) write an entire article on the threats to the insurance industry and their potential ramifications, but for now letโ€™s just consider a couple of the biggest threats to the industry and the potential impacts of failure:

    Home insurance

    In coastal areas of the US โ€“ most notably Florida and California โ€“ major home insurance carriers are already exiting the market. The risks to homes from fires, hurricanes and coastal flooding mean that home insurance is simply unviable across large areas. While the State has stepped in as the insurer of last resort, it is dangerously undercapitalised and ill-prepared to deal with another major climate event.

    Areas like these are the canaries in the coalmine; huge swathes of the worldโ€™s housing stock could become uninsurable in the coming years. Without insurance, banks will not offer mortgages, and the value of houses will drop like a stone. Given how much of the global economy relies on house price stability, this is as dangerous for the global economy as it is for the people living in these areas.

    Cargo insurance and global supply chains

    Cargo insurance underpins global trade and supply chains. As we have seen during the current crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, firms are simply unwilling to offer insurance โ€“ not just because of what is actually taking place on the ground, but because of the ongoing uncertainty and increase in perceived risk. Without this insurance, trade grinds rapidly to a halt. As more and more places become threatened by the impacts of climate change, the percentage of global trade that becomes uninsurable will only increase.

    Forced liquidation and systemic threats

    The global insurance industryโ€™s assets under management are estimated to be more than $40 trillion, or more than 40% of global GDP. Due to years of otherwise sensible investment strategies, they are now heavily exposed to the mortgage, real estate and infrastructure industries โ€“ precisely the asset classes most exposed to climate-related risks. A series of major climate events could force liquidation of assets to meet claims, resulting in a dangerous selling dynamic which will spark memories of the 2008 global financial crisis.


    Sovereign climate default

    TL;DR: in many vital economic centres, sovereign defaults will be made more likely by climate change. Depending on your businessโ€™ particular supply chains and dependencies, such failures could have enormous ramifications. How the international community handles such crises could determine how far the ripples will spread.

    Many of the most debt-ridden economies in the world are also at the most significant risk from the chronic effects of climate change, as well as increasingly frequent and intense climate hazards. This raises the very real possibility of a large, emerging economy defaulting on their sovereign debt as a result of climate change, with cascading effects arounds the world.

    Indonesia โ€“ catastrophic deforestation and peatland degradation are causing havoc within the country, with the capital city already being relocated due to subsidence and flooding. Coupled with the countryโ€™s enormous coal export revenues, which are likely to become less desirable in future, the structural risk to Indonesiaโ€™s economy is enormous. Given the countryโ€™s size and importance to manufacturing supply chains in Asia, a climate-compounded fiscal crisis here would have global ramifications

    Pakistan โ€“ agricultural collapse is a very real possibility under certain climate scenarios. While the primary impact would be to food security across the region, a broader economic and political collapse of a nuclear state could have wider geopolitical ramifications, especially given long-standing and ongoing tensions with close neighbours

    Egypt โ€“ flow reduction or even failure of the Nile, for which more than 250 million people are reliant for water, could result in a climate-compounded fiscal collapse. Aside from the mass migration of affected people, the impact on trade through the Suez Canal would also have wide economic implications.

    Nigeria โ€“ advancing desertification, coupled with widespread flooding in the Niger Delta could put major strain on Africaโ€™s largest economy. The countryโ€™s economy is also highly reliant on oil revenue, creating a heightened risk of major assets becoming stranded in a lower-carbon global economy. A failure to service Nigeriaโ€™s debt also risks chilling climate-related lending across the continent, at precisely the moment it is most needed.


    Failure of the US Corn Belt

    TL;DR: The prosperity of agricultural breadbaskets, like the US Corn Belt, affects far more than just commodity prices. Whether your supply chains lie in agriculture or pharmaceuticals, or just require cardboard packaging, a significant failure in the Corn Belt could have major consequences. And thatโ€™s not to mention the political instability that might follow.

    Why does it matter?

    Known as the Corn Belt, the US Midwest is one of the worldโ€™s great breadbaskets. It produces a third of global maize exports and a quarter of global soybean exports, in addition to significant wheat and pork production. No other single growing region on earth comes close for its financial and systemic impact.

    A structural impairment across the Corn Belt would have dire consequences for food security, economic prosperity and, ultimately, political stability. The first and most obvious impact would be a spike in food prices, firstly of maize and soybeans themselves, but quickly of the protein sources (chicken, pork, beef and fish) that rely on these crops for feed. Such a price spike would be followed, quickly and inevitably, by the detonation of some of the worldโ€™s largest commodity derivatives markets.

    Nearly 40% of US corn goes into domestic ethanol production, so crop failure would also spike gasoline prices and destabilise global agricultural markets, particularly for biofuel producing countries like Brazil whose own pricing is benchmarked against US corn ethanol.

    Processed food manufacturers and fermentation-based pharmaceutical producers, reliant on cheap corn derivatives, would be next to wave the white flag. Meanwhile, paper and cardboard packaging, reliant on corn-starch as a binding agent, would increase prices across almost every supply chain.

    The desperation of agricultural lenders would be matched only by governments scrambling to reprice the sovereign debt of food-importing nations across the Middle East, North and Sub-Saharan Africa. In those regions where food costs represent a large share of household income, political stability is tied closely to food prices, as anyone with a memory of the Arab Spring will know all too well.

    Whatโ€™s the threat from climate change?

    For decades, the pressures of modern agricultural systems have undermined the physical and hydrological systems of the Corn Belt. As climatic stresses increase, the combination increases the risk of crop failure significantly.

    Corn is surprisingly sensitive to temperature at very specific moments in its growth cycle. For example, if temperatures climb above 35ยฐC (95ยฐF) during the plantโ€™s short pollination window, pollen viability and yields fall sharply. Climate change is increasing the duration and intensity of periods of high temperature, increasing the risk of passing this vital threshold.

    Rainfall patterns are also a major concern. As in many places, rainfall is becoming less frequent but more intense, causing runoff and soil erosion. The Corn Belt has traditionally had some of the deepest, richest topsoil anywhere on earth, but the degradation of the prairie ecosystem, compaction from heavy machinery and increased erosion has already reduced carbon in the topsoil by 35%.

    The intervals between rain are also becoming longer and drier, increasing the frequency of drought. Events like the 2012 drought, which caused an estimated $30 billion loss in agricultural output, are likely to become much more frequent. These drought conditions are even more alarming given the state of the Ogallala Aquifer, on which the entire growing region relies. In some areas, half of the aquifer volume has already been depleted and irrigation is only likely to increase as higher temperatures increase crop water demand.


    Permafrost methane feedback loop

    TL;DR: The permafrost is an almost unimaginably massive store of organic carbon at the top of our planet. If a sustained acceleration in Arctic methane emissions were to take hold, the impact on our climate could be civilisational in scale. But the most immediate impact would be an immediate revision the planetโ€™s carbon budget. Every climate target, green bond and sustainability regulation would become materially insufficient overnight. Expect fragmentation of climate policy, threats of litigation and even further growth in the suspicion of climate science.

    What even is the permafrost?

    Locked in frozen soils across Siberia, Alaska, Canada and the Tibetan Plateau, the permafrost contains an estimated 1.5 trillion tonnes of organic carbon, enough to produce roughly 5.5 trillion tonnes of CO2. Thatโ€™s about the same as the entire global forest system and all of the worldโ€™s proven fossil fuel reserves combined.

    By comparison, Earthโ€™s entire atmosphere currently contains approximately 860 billion tonnes of CO2, so the permafrost alone contains enough carbon to produce roughly 6 times the CO2 in our entire atmosphere if it were to be released. The reality is even more alarming: much of the permafrost carbon is actually converted to methane (CH4) when released, rather than carbon dioxide (CO2). Methane has a substantially higher global warming potential carbon dioxide, turning the release of the permafrost into a truly cataclysmic proposition.

    The permafrost is already melting, with Arctic temperature rising at 3-4 times the global average rate. However, we have not yet reached the tipping point at which the melt becomes entirely self-reinforcing. There is still a human off-switch, but there might not be for long.

    So what happens if the feedback loop begins?

    If a permafrost methane feedback loop really takes hold, the carbon budget modelled by the IPCC will be revised sharply downwards. Effectively, that means that every assumption about the levels of emissions reductions we need to make to limit global warming become completely insufficient.

    Every net-zero target becomes redundant. Every sustainability-linked bond becomes junk. Every investment justified by a specific carbon pathway assumption turns bad. The market for carbon offsets and credits would implode. Climate-related insurances would be repriced or withdrawn overnight.

    And then would come the politics.

    Some jurisdictions might respond by tightening policy dramatically, accelerating fossil fuel phase-out and imposing aggressive carbon pricing. Others would argue the scientists clearly donโ€™t know what theyโ€™re talking about, and continue down the road of denials and delays that are the marker of so much of todayโ€™s climate policy. Amongst the general public, many more would become entirely apathetic, conceding defeat to the inevitability of climate Armageddon.

    Some would even see a silver lining of new shipping routes and opportunities for resource extraction, triggering a wave of territorial disputes. Greenland would be only the beginning.

    Is there any point planning for such a cataclysm?

    This scenario is a transition planning nightmare. It forces businesses to confront a risk that sits entirely outside current scenario-planning architecture. It is virtually impossible to model, to price or to hedge. It would therefore be a legitimate challenge to ask whether there is even any point in stress-testing a scenario that represents an existential threat to civilisation itself.

    But hereโ€™s why it still matters: even the most destabilising scenario has a reasonably long period of transition. An organisation that has stress-tested that transition to multiple plausible planetary futures, however bleak, will be in a fundamentally better position to one that hasnโ€™t. Any organisation that has understood and internalised a catastrophic scenario will be in a stronger position to make different and better decisions about capital allocation, long-term debt and lobby priorities. The point is not to have a plan for 2080, but to make better decisions today.

    Ultimately, the willingness and ability to plan and stress-test against this sort of scenario is what defines the kind of organisation you are. As an organisation, do you look clearly at the worst plausible outcomes and let them shape your behaviour, or just look away because the view is uncomfortable? In a world where the permafrost feedback scenario is a very real and live scientific possibility, that choice is both a moral and strategic statement.


    Whatโ€™s your view? What climate shocks should businesses consider in their scenario planning? Is there even any point considering the most cataclysmic scenarios? Share your thoughts in the comments.

    At Sirocco, we work with companies to understand climate-related risks beyond the obvious. If youโ€™re starting to think seriously about what the climate means for your business, or want to understand what UK SRS could mean for you, weโ€™re always glad to have that conversation โ€“ just drop us a message.

    ClimateRisk #UKSRS #Climate

  • The Illusion of Certainty: why climate compliance rarely leads to climate resilience

    The Illusion of Certainty: why climate compliance rarely leads to climate resilience

    The global push for climate transparency is creating a disturbing Illusion of Certainty – an insidious belief that if we can produce a well-researched report, we are doing enough to manage and adapt to the chaos of a changing planet. The result is that climate risk continues to be institutionally underestimated, despite new standards and heavier regulatory pressure.

    This article explores this problem and identifies 3 key questions organisations should be asking themselves in order to understand how to build real climate resilience.


    For boards, investors and C-suites, climate risk acronyms have become a security blanket. From TCFD, UK SRS and ESRS to a hundred regional variations of ISSB, thousands of hours and millions of dollars are being spent to align to new global standards. When efforts and resources are well aligned, the result can be a polished, audited and beautifully designed report that projects a sense of control.

    But this spread of glossy new reports is quickly revealing an inconvenient truth: regulatory box-ticking does not equal resilience.

    While the world is getting better at reporting climate risks and opportunities, the outputs suggest that most organisations seem to be no better at understanding them. (And as my article last week detailed, the first round of ISSB S2-aligned reports in Australia suggest that many are struggling to even tick the boxes…)

    The danger is that a global push for transparency is creating a disturbing Illusion of Certainty – a belief that if we can produce a well-researched report, we are doing enough to manage and adapt to the chaos of a changing planet. The result is that climate risk continues to be institutionally underestimated, despite new standards and heavier regulatory pressure.


    The compliance trap

    Climate reporting frameworks are increasingly designed to align climate and financial reporting, with the hope that this create a natural convergence of climate considerations with the financial health of the business. Despite this, frameworks and reports consistently fail to drive strategic direction. Too often the results focus on the obvious, the direct and the measurable, ignoring the fundamental vulnerabilities that risk being exposed amidst the economy-shifting uncertainties of a changing climate.

    We see well-meaning organisations take an approach that focuses almost entirely on physical damage to their own assets or stops the hunt for risks at their Tier 1 suppliers. The result is a report that vastly underestimates the real threats to a businessโ€™ future success.

    The real threats – the ones that collapse margins and break business models – are often hidden within the complexity of the global value chain or lurking in the infrastructure on which your business relies. Oversight of these threats creates massive strategic blind spots: for example, research published in the International Journal of Disaster Risk Science suggests a 300% increase in economic losses when power outages are included in a risk assessment. Most compliance reports remain dangerously silent on these transboundary shocks, ignoring volatile, systemic threats to a business.


    It’s time to get uncomfortable and search beyond the obvious

    Ticking the boxes of climate compliances alone does not build resilience or protect revenue. Whatโ€™s needed is a fundamentally different set of questions โ€“ ones that most current modelling approaches never get around to asking. Here are the 3 questions your organisation needs to be asking itself right now:

    1. Is your climate risk assessment asking about assets, or about the processes that keep your business running?

    Far too many physical climate risk assessments begin with the question: โ€œwhich of our assets are exposed?โ€ Thatโ€™s the wrong starting point. The right questions are: โ€œwhich processes underpin our revenue? How could climate disruption break them?โ€

    A flood in a key port doesnโ€™t have to touch your factory to stop your production line. True resilience begins by understanding the operational and commercial processes that drive revenue โ€“ production, procurement, logistics, distribution โ€“ and pinpointing climate risks within the complex network of suppliers, partners and infrastructure nodes on which these processes depend. Most organisations havenโ€™t done this. Anyone applying meaningful scrutiny to a climate report should be asking why.

    2. Are you tracking how risks cascade, or just where they originate?

    Understanding where climate risks enter your value chain is only the beginning. What matters is how they travel โ€“ from a disrupted supplier or distributor to a bottlenecked process and a revenue shortfall.

    Any organisation that has mapped its value chain but not understood how climate risks cascade along it has not fully understand its exposure. After all, the risks that collapse business models are rarely the ones sitting on the surface. The key to resilience is to understand how risks cascade across the value chain, creating disruption and impacting revenue. At that point, organisations can begin to understand the specific actions that might mitigate that risk.

    3. Does your analysis lead to good decisions, or just compliant disclosures?

    Even genuinely good climate data is wasted if it doesn’t lead to action. The test of any climate risks analysis must be whether it tells you where and how to act. Ultimately, an organisation needs to know which risks warrant investment in resilience and which need further investigation. Too often, material risks are ignored because they sit beyond the boundary of what a reporting framework requires. The result is that organisations take the most obvious path and spend money on protecting their own assets, wasting money ignoring potentially catastrophic risks beyond the factory walls.

    These arenโ€™t abstract questions and theyโ€™re largely absent from how most organisations approach compliance with UK SRS, TCFD and other compliance frameworks. Theyโ€™re the ones that separate organisations genuinely building resilience from those producing reports that give the appearance of it.


    Beyond the Illusion of Certainty lies true resilience

    The goal of any climate strategy should not be to produce a perfect report; it should be to build an unshakeable business. From business leaders and investors to auditors and regulators, we all have a duty to ignore the Illusion of Certainty and dig deeper to understand climate risks might impact businesses and organisations.

    To those who sense that the current approaches to understanding climate risk are too thin: youโ€™re right. The risks are much broader and much deeper than most models โ€“ and most compliance reports โ€“ are telling you.


    Whatโ€™s your view? Is the Illusion of Certainty real or can regulatory reporting in its current form lead to real resilience? Let me know your thoughts in the comments.

    At Sirocco, we work with companies to understand climate risks across their value chain, building the kind of analysis that drives real decisions, as well as compliant disclosures. If youโ€™d like to learn more, just drop us a message.


  • Australiaโ€™s first mandated climate reports are in. Here’s what UK Firms can learn with UK SRS on the way.

    Australiaโ€™s first mandated climate reports are in. Here’s what UK Firms can learn with UK SRS on the way.

    The first wave of ISSB S2-aligned sustainability reports (known as AASB S2 in Australia) landed in early 2026. The results vary wildly in quality, with some excellent, well-researched examples sitting alongside some bafflingly limited disclosures. With less than twelve months before mandatory UK SRS reporting is likely to come in to force, Australiaโ€™s experience – warts and all – is the closest thing to a real-world rehearsal we have.

    Why listen to me?

    Until last year, I was based in Australia, leading the efforts of a company to understand climate-related risks and manage the demands of AASB S2 compliance – and talking to many others doing the same. This article charts the lessons the UK can learn from the Australian experience, from the leadership conversations that should have happened earlier, the gaps in expertise and governance and the inevitable last-minute scrambles.


    Why the Australian experience matters for UK companies

    AASB S2 and UK SRS are built from the same blueprint: the ISSBโ€™s IFRS Climate-related Disclosures standards. Both use the same four disclosure pillars โ€“ governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets. Both require scenario analysis, Scope 1 and 2 emissions from the outset, with Scope 3 entering on a phased basis. Both are backed by assurance requirements that will tighten over time.

    The UK government formally published UK SRS S1 and S2 on 25 February 2026 โ€“ the same week that Australian companies were filing their first reports. The standards are now available for voluntary use, with the FCA consulting on mandatory adoption for listed companies until 20 March 2026. Final FCA rules are expected in autumn 2026, with requirements coming into force from 1 January 2027.

    That gives UK firms less than twelve months before mandatory reporting likely begins. Australiaโ€™s experience, warts and all, is the closest thing to a real-world rehearsal we have.


    The first reports are inโ€ฆandโ€ฆ gulp.

    Australiaโ€™s largest corporations and significant emitters are at the vanguard of a landmark moment in corporate climate reporting, with the first mandatory ISSB-aligned sustainability reports published in early 2026.

    PwC Australia reviewed 22 of these first-wave disclosures published on the ASX by 27 February 2026. What they found is probably not surprising to anyone who has had to navigate new reporting standards: report lengths ranged from just 7 pages to 82 pages and quality varies enormously โ€“ not just across industries, but between direct peers too. Some companies published detailed disclosure indices that clearly mapped their report to the standardโ€™s requirements; others produced documents that raised more questions than they answered.

    “The market is building sustainability reporting capability in real time” PWC Australia

    For a disclosure thatโ€™s meant to help investors get better informed about the climate-related risks facing a business, thatโ€™s a big concern. Over the years, the assurance requirements for these reports ramp up, so all eyes will be on whether the big audit firms can do the job of increasing and enforcing quality.

    Either way, for UK firms watching from a distance, such variability should be a wake-up call. In a market where investors are used to reviewing TCFD-aligned reports, firms that fail to adequately understand and disclose their climate risks could face far higher consequences in the market than their Australian counterparts.


    Five lessons UK firms should take from the Australian experience

    1. The Governance disclosure is harder than it looks

    One of the most common stumbling blocks in the first Australian reports was the governance pillar. Australian boards quickly discovered that describing how the board โ€œmonitors and overseesโ€ climate risks is far more demanding than simply listing committee responsibilities. The Australian Institute of Company Directors noted that many boards initially treated climate reporting as an extension of existing compliance processes, only to discover it required a structural shift in how boards engage with climate as a strategic issue.

    For UK boards, the learning should be this: governance disclosures must be evidenced, specific, and audit-ready. Describing a Climate & ESG Committee that meets quarterly is not sufficient. The standard asks how climate considerations influence actual decisions โ€“ capital allocation, executive incentives, strategic planning. UK firms should be building board skills matrices, documenting escalation processes and linking climate KPIs to executive pay now, not after the first draft of their report is written.

    2. Effective scenario analysis is where reports are won and lost

    UK SRS requires companies to conduct climate scenario analysis under at least two temperature pathways. In theory, this is a forward-looking analytical exercise. In practice, many first-wave Australian reports revealed scenario analysis that was boilerplate, unconnected to the companyโ€™s actual business model, or so hedged with caveats as to be uninformative.

    The expectation โ€“ from regulators and investors alike โ€“ is that scenario analysis should inform, not decorate, a report. It should demonstrate that the company has genuinely tested its strategy against different futures, quantified where possible and linked outcomes to specific financial exposures.

    What the Australian reports made painfully clear is that this kind of analysis canโ€™t be done in isolation. The climate risks that matter most to a business rarely sit nearly within its own operations; they live in the supply chain, in the behaviour of customers, in energy infrastructure and critical logistics nodes.

    Scenario analysis built on a shallow understanding of value chain risk tends to produce the kind of vague, caveat-laden disclosure that regulators and investors will quickly lose patience with. Starting this work now, rather than approaching it as a last-minute disclosure exercise, is the difference between a credible report and one that raises more questions than it answers.

    3. Donโ€™t wait for year 2 to begin tackling Scope 3

    Both AASB S2 and UK SRS S2 offer transitional relief on Scope 3 emissions in the first year of reporting. Many Australian Group 1 companies took that relief, but 12 of the 22 first-wave reporters reviewed by PwC Australia voluntarily disclosed at least some Scope 3 categories anyway.

    For many larger UK companies, disclosing scope 3 emissions has been standard for several years, but thatโ€™s certainly not universal. For those with complex supply chains or financed emissions, developing credible methodologies and building the necessary data architecture to calculate emissions can take time โ€“ often 12โ€“18 months of focused effort. Companies that wait until year 2 to start thinking about scope 3 will likely face another mad scramble. The relief should be treated as a runway, not an excuse.

    4. Assurance is a process, not a final step

    Australiaโ€™s assurance regime requires limited assurance over Scope 1 and 2 emissions and governance disclosures from Year 1, scaling toward reasonable assurance across all disclosures by the time financial years beginning on or after 1 July 2030 begin. While the UKโ€™s approach is yet to be finalised, the FRC has been asked to establish an interim register of sustainability assurance practitioners by mid-2026, with the relevant standard (ISSA (UK) 5000) effective for periods beginning on or after 15 December 2026.

    The lesson from Australia is that companies that treated assurance as a sign-off at the end of the reporting process often ran into trouble. PwCโ€™s review found that early engagement with assurance providers โ€“ bringing them into methodology decisions, boundary-setting, and emissions calculations early โ€“ significantly reduced late-stage rework and strengthened confidence in the numbers. UK firms should be in conversation with their auditors now, not after the first report is drafted.

    Note โ€“ thereโ€™s a challenge for auditors here too. How can accountants and climate risk experts be brought together to provide proper scrutiny of UK SRS disclosures?

    5. โ€˜Compliantโ€™ is not the same as โ€˜goodโ€™

    Perhaps the most uncomfortable lesson from Australia is that technically compliant disclosures can still be deeply unsatisfying. Some first-wave reports ticked all the boxes but remain completely useless as a guide to understanding the climate risks a business is facing or what they are doing about them.

    ASIC – the Australian regulator – is taking a pragmatic approach during the transition period, but regulatory patience has a shelf life. Investor and media scrutiny may not be so kind. UK companies are likely to be on an even shorter leash, given that many of them have already had to report TCFD-aligned disclosures.

    Ultimately, the lesson to learn is that smart companies should be using the preparation window to do the groundwork thatโ€™s needed to build genuinely informative reports. Those that do will be far better positioned when scrutiny increases and sophisticated investors start asking the tough questions…


    The bottom line for UK firms

    The FCA consultation closes on 20 March 2026. Mandatory rules for listed companies are expected by autumn, with requirements in force from January 2027. That is not a long runway. And while the UK standards include some transitional relief provisions โ€“ scope 3 on a comply-or-explain basis, UK SRS S1 with a two-year grace period โ€“ the direction of travel is clear.

    Australiaโ€™s experience shows that companies that fail to treat climate reporting as a genuine strategic discipline produce reports that range from thin to embarrassing. Companies that start early, invest in skills, bring boards into substantive climate governance and treat assurance as a process rather than a formality produce something different: a report that informs investors and serves as the basis for future commercial resilience.

    Australia is giving us a library of the good, the bad and the ugly. The question now: will UK firms take advantage?


    Whatโ€™s your view? What are the biggest challenges facing UK firms in preparing for UK SRS? Are we headed for the same spectrum of reports weโ€™re seeing from Australia? Share your thoughts in the comments.

    At Sirocco, we work with companies to map climate-related risks across their value chains and translate that analysis into disclosure-ready, investor-grade reporting. If youโ€™re starting to think seriously about UK SRS and want to understand what the preparation process actually involves, Iโ€™d be glad to have that conversation โ€“ just drop us a message.

    UKSustainabilityReporting #UKSRS #ClimateDisclosure #AASBS2 #IFRS S2 #ISSB #ESG #Sustainability #CorporateReporting #ClimateRisk

  • How will you manage risk when the insurance market retreats?

    How will you manage risk when the insurance market retreats?

    How will you manage risk when the insurance market retreats?

    Insurance is the load-bearing wall of the global economy. When climate change breaks the models, how will your business transfer risk?

    (more…)